

# TRAINING NOTES



## Civil Affairs Forces Civilians on the Battlefield at the JRTC

**MEMBERS OF THE COMBAT TRAINING BRANCH (CTC)  
U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYOPS COMMAND, AND CA PLANNERS AT THE JRTC**

Civil Affairs (CA) forces can greatly enhance mission accomplishment for a maneuver brigade commander undergoing evaluation during a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation. Various tactical scenarios have demonstrated the value of CA forces when they are properly integrated into maneuver force operations.

The JRTC offers battalion and brigade commanders and their staffs the most realistic training short of actual conflict. It is at brigade level that CA forces integrate with the maneuver force in a stressful, near-combat environment. The employment of CA forces during Civil-Military Operations (CMOs) will enhance the military effort in all operational environments. The versatility and flexibility of CA forces help the maneuver commander minimize civilian interference and also facilitate and lend legitimacy to U.S. military operations and objectives.

In peacetime and at various levels of conflict, military operations have proved more effective when commanders successfully integrated CA forces into their operational and tactical plans. Although conditions differ throughout the operational continuum, CA forces help commanders establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships among military forces, civil authorities,

and the civilian populace within an area of operations (AO).

The term CA refers to the type of force as well as the operations the force conducts. The term CMO refers to a type of operation; for example, one that involves both civilians and the military. Although CMOs may or may not include CA forces, CA operations always include CA forces. For example, infantry units conduct infantry operations in support of combat operations; CA units conduct CA operations in support of CMOs, which may or may not support combat operations.

CA operations are those executed as an integral part of a military mission. The CA forces provide the local authorities and populace in an area with an understanding of the military operations and the consolidation activities being undertaken by the U.S. to achieve its objectives.

CA forces are employed to support two distinct missions: CMOs, as described above, and support to a host nation's civil administration. The emphasis at the JRTC is on CMOs.

The civilian dimension has grown larger and more complex in recent years. Civil-military operations help commanders influence, control, and develop civilian activities and organizations. Maneuver commanders with

civilians in their sectors have inherent responsibilities for CMOs, including the following sub-mission related activities:

- Foreign nation support.
- Populace and resource control.
- Humanitarian assistance.
- Military civic action.
- Civil defense.

### **Integrating CA Forces**

Members of U.S. Army CA units are either tactical generalists or functional specialists. Tactical civil affairs forces normally operate within a command relationship, and are normally attached to maneuver commanders. Civil affairs specialists (functional specialty teams) also operate within a command relationship but may not always work for a maneuver commander. It is not uncommon for functional specialists to work under the tactical control of an Ambassador, a U.S. representative or other agency director, and yet receive administrative and logistical support from a military force operating in the area.

During pre-combat operations, CA forces work with the unit S-5 or G-5 on the CMO Estimate of the Situation, CMO Annex, and other CMO or CA-related appendices to the operations plan or order. The CMO Annex outlines the CMO mission, the elements

involved in its execution, and the priorities. CA forces also assist during the planning phase in analyzing operational courses of action against key CA-related factors. The CA soldier's goal is to help the commander minimize civilian interference with military operations.

Post-combat operations may be supported by providing a means of reconstructing public administration organizations and facilities, and giving the commander a means of conducting the transition from military to civil agencies. CA forces can interface with host nation civil and military authorities, as well as provide language and cultural expertise to U.S. military commanders. While CA forces, through daily contact, are in a position to obtain information from civilians, the role of CA in collection must remain passive. (Executive Order 12333 dated 4 Dec 1981, and USSOCOM Directive 11-1 prohibits SOF personnel from actively collecting intelligence and information.)

## Civil Affairs Support Teams

A CA Brigade Support Team (BST) is staffed by USAR Civil Affairs units. A CA Tactical Support Team (TST) may be staffed by either Active Army or USAR Civil Affairs units. (See accompanying box.)

Various Civil Affairs support teams provide CA support to maneuver brigades and battalions. These teams usually consist of four to six soldiers, depending on the level of command to be supported. Vehicle and communications assets are organic to these teams, but supported commanders should be aware that the Army is currently fielding Civil Affairs forces with multiple subscriber equipment (MSE), with fielding to be completed during Fiscal Year 2000. Because 97 percent of the Civil Affairs force is in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), the maneuver commander may have either an Active Army or a USAR team organized as follows:

These teams function as the brigade CMO staff and provide civil affairs support as required. The teams conduct general and limited technical assess-

- CA BRIGADE SUPPORT TEAM (BST)**
- Commander, Major (38A).
  - Operations Officer, Captain (38A).
  - Team Sergeant, Sergeant First Class (38A40).
  - CA Sergeant, Staff Sergeant (38A30).
  - CA Sergeant, Sergeant (38A20).
  - CA Specialist, Specialist (38A10).

- CA TACTICAL SUPPORT TEAM (TST)**  
USAR TST:
- Civil Military Operations Officer, Captain (38A).
  - Team Sergeant, Staff Sergeant (38A30)\*.
  - CA Sergeant, Sergeant (38A20)\*.
  - CA Specialist, Specialist (38A10)\*.
- ACTIVE DUTY TST:
- Civil Military Operations Officer, Captain (39C).
  - Operations/Intelligence NCO, Sergeant First Class (18F40)\*.
  - Engineer NCO, Sergeant First Class (18C40)\*.
  - Medical NCO, Sergeant First Class (18D40)\*.

*\*The CA Branch, CMF 38A, exists only in the USAR. Selected CMF 18 NCOs and FA 39C Officers are in the Active Army. (See attachment for duty descriptions of team members.)*

ments as well as provide advice and assistance concerning regional and cultural matters.

Commanders requesting CA forces should recognize that for contingencies and quick-reaction crises the Active Army CA soldiers provide immediate deployment response. These soldiers are specialists in CMO and are qualified to provide cultural expertise, limited language capability, and expertise in dislocated civilian (DC) operations. Most CA operations, however, require the application of specific civilian-related skills that are available only within USAR CA units. As a result, Active Army CA forces are typically deployed on a quick-reaction basis until USAR soldiers can replace them.

CA forces can also orchestrate a coordinated effort between the maneuver unit and any nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), international organizations, and local governments operating within the area of responsibility. In summary, without proper CMO planning and the effective use of attached CA soldiers and teams, commanders must use their own soldiers and resources to resolve difficult situa-

tions involving civilian matters.

During a JRTC rotation, a brigade or battalion commander may encounter various situations, each of which includes tasks typically coordinated or monitored by attached CA elements. A brigade commander who allows the brigade or battalion CA team to focus on and coordinate such situations will be better able to achieve his military objectives without distraction or reorientation of his maneuver force.

## Civilians on the Battlefield

Each town or village within the JRTC maneuver box is populated with role players acting as civilians with a certain political profile. These people present an ideal opportunity for the maneuver commander to determine how to win the support of the local populace. This situation is best accomplished by sending a CA team into the village to open a dialogue with the local officials. As might be expected, failure to do so may result in increased disruption of military operations by the OPFOR and hamper control of the village.

"Civilians on the Battlefield" is a term commonly used by the JRTC staff and observer-controllers. These civilians may include the following categories, among others:

- Displaced Person—a civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundary of his resident country in time of war. (Also a generic doctrinal term that may include the following groups as well.)

- Refugee—A civilian who, because of real or imagined danger, has left his residence to seek safety.

- Evacuee—A civilian removed from his residence by military order.

- Stateless person—A civilian who meets any of the following criteria—who has been de-nationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish his right to the nationality he claims.

- War victim—A classification created during the Vietnam era to describe a civilian suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of his home as a result of war.

Towns and villages at the JRTC are populated with civilians because of their

potential to affect the unit's mission. A primary doctrinal task for the CA team is to help the unit S-5 develop plans to minimize civilian interference with the unit's mission. These civilians are the responsibility of the maneuver commander, as outlined in Field Manual (FM) 27-10, *Law of Land Warfare*.

Information gained from interaction with the local population can be invaluable in determining the most effective methods and techniques to use in dealing with complex military-civilian situations. The CA team should review this information, share it with the unit S-5, S-3, and commander and recommend a course of action that supports the unit's mission.

In the absence of this interaction between the CA team and the civilians on the battlefield, the maneuver commander may need to use other organic units that, through no fault of their own, lack the expertise to resolve such issues. Maneuver commanders, by virtue of their position on the battlefield, run the risk of further complicating any problems these civilians may present, as well as unnecessarily spending time and resources on efforts to solve those problems.

In today's world, civilians are likely to be dislocated by virtually any type of conflict, and maneuver brigade commanders must recognize the ways in which they can affect operations. The CA team is the maneuver commander's primary resource for reducing the impact of these people on operations. As an integral part of the JRTC training experience, the team's proper role in coordinating civilian movement and handling through establishment of control measures reduces the effects of civilians on the brigade's operations.

As previously mentioned, it is important that the maneuver commander learn the political climate prevalent in the villages in the AO, and this insight may be obtained from information gathered by the CA team. The attitude of the populace may range from neutral to pro-government or from neutral to anti-government.

When the attitude leans toward pro-government, commanders must open a dialogue with the local village officials.

Failure to do so may alienate the populace and open the door to OPFOR influence instead.

The CA team's actions can reinforce the positive perception of U.S. forces and its efforts to help the people of the village, and these steps can lead to greater cooperation from the populace.

When the attitude tends toward anti-government, a commander's failure to effect contact with a local village can lead to increased resistance to U.S. forces and aid the cause of the OPFOR. Since the populace has seen and possibly assisted the OPFOR, efforts to win their support greatly increase the chances of a successful mission. CA teams are an excellent medium for such contact.

Towns or villages that have a neutral-to-negative attitude give the commander an excellent opportunity to gain valuable information about the OPFOR. Sending a CA team to talk with local officials and leaders in the area demonstrates U.S. concern for the safety and well-being of the populace. Visits to local officials may also help lead the populace to support friendly forces.

### Coordination

Coordination with civil or military authorities is essential to the success of CMOs. Military commanders at all levels can influence both the populace and the civil authorities in many ways to help the brigade accomplish its mission. They use the CA teams coordinate with the NGOs and PVOs portrayed during the rotation.

An example of civil-military cooperation occurs during the DC flow portion of a rotation. Also, coordination with the NGOs and PVOs will result in a more controlled flow of DCs with minimum effect on brigade operations. The coordination the CA team performs can allow for the use of host nation assets to control and move civilians away from main supply routes, thus reducing the amount of brigade assets required.

Improperly conducted coordination will result in an uncontrolled flow of DCs throughout the brigade's AO. Failure to properly coordinate for host nation support will also force the bri-

### CIVIL AFFAIRS DUTY DESCRIPTIONS

**38A Civil Affairs Specialist (USAR)**—CA specialists conduct coordination, research, analysis, and execute civil affairs related functional specialty missions. They plan, train, advise, assist, and execute CMO and other programs to accomplish national objectives.

**18 Series Special Forces (Active)**—These soldiers act primarily as Civil Affairs generalists in addition to performing 18-series skills (Operations/Intelligence, Engineer, and Medical). They are capable of supporting the maneuver commander's immediate needs by supervising or conducting CMOs that support the tactical mission. They are CA-qualified but normally do not have the civilian-based functional skills of a Civil Affairs specialist.

**38A Civil Affairs Officer (USAR)**—The 38A CA officer is technically qualified within a civilian-based functional skill. The CA officer plans, trains, advises, assists, and executes CMOs and other programs to accomplish national objectives. In addition, he commands or serves in CA units, S-5/G-5 positions requiring CA experience or training, and in command or staff positions requiring the following:

- Political knowledge and diplomacy skills to advise and interact with senior officials (ministerial level) of foreign nations and ability to conduct coordination or liaison between U.S. military, foreign governments and civilians, civilian relief agencies, and other U.S. Government agencies, and use interpersonal and cross-cultural communicative skills to facilitate interaction.

- Knowledge and ability to provide advice and assistance to civil, paramilitary, and military leaders of U.S. and foreign nations involving matters concerning CMO.

**39C Civil Affairs Officer (AC)**—The 39C Civil Affairs Officer (AC) performs the same duties and requires the same knowledge as the 38A Civil Affairs Officer (USAR). In addition, the 39C Civil Affairs Officer has other requirements such as a language skill and Airborne qualification.

gade to use its own assets to transport DCs to and from the collection points. Additionally, coordination with local medical authorities reduces the need for the brigade to provide medical assistance to the DCs.

**Shelter for the Homeless.** In the event homeless civilians request shelter, the CA team may be used to ascertain how many there are and the location of suitable shelter. Finding shelter for these civilians may free supply routes, improve battlefield circulation control, and encourage a stay-put policy.

**Food and Medical Assistance.**

While it is still the local government's responsibility to feed and provide for its population, civilians may look to the military commander in the AO for food and medicine. After every effort has been made to have the local government take responsibility for resolving the problem using civilian resources, support and assistance may be provided when necessary. Captured enemy supplies may be used to feed and provide medicine to the local populace. U.S. supplies should be used only in emergency cases.

**Protection from Combat Operations.** The panic caused by combat operations themselves may lead to unnecessary civilian casualties. Coordination with local officials can help enforce a stay-put policy or a controlled evacuation, thus enabling the maneuver commander to manage his battlespace with minimal civilian interference.

**Protection from Enemy Forces or Guerrillas.** In the event local national forces cannot provide adequate security for their citizens, U.S. forces may have to provide some sort of protection against enemy or guerrilla forces. A logical strategy is to coordinate with local officials to identify civilians who may be loyal to enemy forces and have them detained by civilian authorities.

If a commander finds it necessary to use U.S. combat units to locate and destroy enemy forces, the plan should focus on ensuring civilian cooperation and support (stay-put, screening, combat information from civilians). A sense of security among the populace will increase support to U.S. forces in the area. Failure to provide a secure environment may lead to continued fear, suspicion, panic, and increased civilian and military casualties.

**Support in Restoring Facilities.** In restoring damaged facilities, again, U.S. military resources are used only as a last resort. If U.S. forces have not caused the damage, leaders should coordinate with civilian officials for necessary repairs using local resources. The brigade simply does not have the equipment or resources to make major repairs. In cases where U.S. forces have caused the damage, local officials should be informed that repairs and or reparations

can be requested after the cessation of combat operations. Repairs to facilities will keep refugees to a minimum, ensure U.S. use of key facilities, if necessary, and encourage favorable views towards U.S. forces.

**Reports of Civilian Deaths.** Reports of civilian deaths must be handled carefully. Failure to show concern for civilian deaths places U.S. forces in a bad light with the local population. This lack of concern may alienate the local populace, and give the OPFOR an incident to exploit.

The recommended action for a commander is to determine whether deaths have actually occurred, whether U.S. forces have been operating in the suspected location of the remains, and whether the deaths were due to U.S. forces or enemy forces.

If it appears that U.S. forces have caused the deaths, an initial investigation should be conducted to determine the proximate cause of death. The proper recovery and disposition of civilian remains should then be coordinated with local officials.

**Reports of Livestock Deaths.** Livestock losses during combat operations can greatly affect the economy of an area and rapidly turn public sentiment against U.S. forces. Livestock must be considered a source of livelihood for the populace, and this must therefore be given the attention it demands.

If U.S. forces kill livestock, the private owner of that livestock has grounds for a claim against the United States. Identifying what type and how many will help resolve problems.

**Unrecoverable Minefields.** Unrecoverable minefields left behind when U.S. forces move to new locations can have devastating consequences for the local populace. Beyond the obvious personal suffering, unrecovered mines also deny farmers the use of their fields, hinder the resumption of agricultural production, deny access to markets, reduce public confidence in fledgling governments, and cause resentment of U.S. forces.

Before units move, it is the commander's responsibility to see that his engineers verify the locations, dimensions, and number of minefields that

will not be recovered and report this information to local civilian officials. Coordination must be made with civil officials, PSYOP units, and public affairs officers to disseminate the information.

**Requests for Refugee Status.** Displaced civilians often request refugee status, which only the Department of State can grant. But the local commander—normally at division but no lower than brigade—does have the authority to grant temporary refuge. When refugee status is granted, corps headquarters provides follow-on instructions or guidance.

**Transportation Support.** If providing transportation for civilians adversely affects operations, the CA team can explain to civilian authorities that the civilians will have to use local assets or walk, using specified routes.

When transportation is for movement of cargo, priority of transport is required. If the cargo is emergency food or medical supplies to support DC operations, supporting the request may adversely affect tactical operations.

Civilians on the battlefield have been, and will continue to be, a fact of life in combat. The CA team's primary mission at the tactical level is to minimize civilian interference with the maneuver unit's ability to accomplish its objective. The proper use of CA resources in CMOs can contribute significantly to mission success, whether it is at the JRTC or in an actual contingency. A commander's increased awareness of the versatility and employability of his attached civil affairs forces will enhance mission accomplishment in all kinds of training and combat.

---

The authors of this article are the following:

**Major Michael A. Eyre**, Deputy Chief, Humanitarian Demining Office, CENTCOM J-5.

**Major Alvin T. Banker, Jr.**, CA planner, JRTC.

**Captain David J. Albanese**, Deputy Chief, Collective Training Branch, U.S. Army CA & PSYOPs Command.

**Sergeant First Class John Stockton**, Special Forces Branch (PSYOPs), U.S. Army CA & PSYOPs Command.

**Sergeant First Class Colleen M. Burrows**, Office of G-3, U.S. Army CA & PSYOPs Command.

---